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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER LARSON, ALEIDA P. 
LARSON and JON LARSON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
ROBERT GEORGE EVANS, 
M.D., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 9365 
BRIEF OF RESPON'DENT 
STATElVi:ENT OF FACTS 
The respondent does not accept or agree with 
the statement of facts in Appellants' brief. Plain-
tiff's statement of facts is incomplete and contains 
only one paragraph relating to the testimony of Jon 
Larson. The testimony of plaintiffs' witness was 
inconsistent and contradictory and appellants' have 
excluded most of the inconsistent ·and contradictory 
evidence which showed contributory negligence on 
the part of Jon Larson from plaintiffs' brief. 
The following statement is submitted to supple-
ment and clarify plaintiffs' statement of facts. 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SPECIAL INTERROGATORY 
Special interrogatories were submitted to the 
jury by the court (R. 440) and the jury answered 
'interrogatory No. 1 "yes" (R. 440) saying that the 
,negligence of Robert George Evans caused or con-
tributed to the cause of the accident and the injuries 
of which plaintiffs complain (R. 440). 
CONFLICTING EVIDENCE S'HOWING 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
On cross examination Jon Larson testified the 
accident occurred on a dry, clear night and at a 
time when there was no other traffic entering the 
'intersection from the North or West (R. 405). The 
,plaintiff driver testified the only lights in the area 
were on the Southwest corner of the intersection 
60 to 70 feet away (R. 405, 406). Jon Darson 
testified he used the intersection regularly, at least 
three times a day, and that because a friend of his 
was injured in the intersection he knew his exact 
speed and had slowed down to 25 miles per hour at 
the time he entered the intersection (R. 409). The 
'.plaintiff driver testified he did not see the defen-
dant's car until he was in the intersection (R. 409, 
410 )and that he was going 25 miles per hour at 
the time he first saw the defendant's car ( R. 409). 
Jon Larson testified the defendant's car was 
going at least twice as fast as he was going (R. 
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409). Plaintiff's Exhibit P-4 showed plaintiff's car 
travelled 52 feet after the impact and that defen-
dant's car travelled only 50 feet after the impact. 
Exhibit P-4 also shows place of impact as in the 
Northeast quadrant of the intersection. Officer Gunn 
testified defendant's vehicle left no skid m1arks (R. 
130). Officer Gunn, plaintiff's witness, testified 
Larson car left 40 feet of skrd marks prior to im-
pact (R. 199). 
At time Jon Larson's deposition was taken he 
testified he never saw the defendant's auto until 
the front end of his car was at the middle of Ever-
green ( R. 410). Also Jon Larson admitted he had 
no recollection of using his br1akes until he heard 
Officer Gunn testify (R. 1919). When Jon Larson's 
deposition was taken he told us he did not apply 
his brakes ( R. 199) . 
Inconsistently, Jon Larson testified as set forth 
in page 4 of Appellants' brief that he saw the head-
lights of defendant's car for two seconds (R. 173) 
and from that observation formed an opinion ~as to 
its speed (R.173). 
Then on cross examination Jon Larson testi-
fied he di'd not see the defendant's car until it was 
into the intersection (R. 409, 'R. 198). 
Further, Jon Larson testified, inconsistently, 
saying as he entered the intersection he had no 
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thought of anyone approaching from the East (R. 
171) 'and then turned around and said for two 
seconds (R. 173) he observed defendant's car to 
form an opinion as to it's speed ( R. 173) . 
Jon Larson's testimony after the accident show-
ed he was not confused and that imr.aediately he ran 
over to the drug store and called an an1bulance 
(R. 173, 1'7 4). Also, he claimed to have no diffi-
iculty in recollecting what Dr. Evans said at the 
'scene of the accident (R. 17 4, 175). 
Jon Larson's testimony about his income was 
interesting. At ti'rne of trial he testified he had a 
monthly salary of $500.00 (R. 194). Another time 
he admitted under oath (R. 202, 203) that in his 
deposition he told me he was m'aking $1,000.00 per 
month. This latter statement was an exaggeration, 
said Jon Larson ( R. '203, '204). 
At the trial plaintiffs requested no instruction 
on the speed lin1it in the area on 23rd East '(R. 21-
\3'7), and offered no evidence on the posted speed 
limit. Further, plaintiffs did not object to the court 
giving Instruction No. 4 ( R. 69). 
OFFICER GUNN 
Plaintiffs called Officer Gunn 'as an expert wit-
ness on speed of plain tiff's vehicle ( R. 419) . Offi-
.cer Gunn testified that based only on the 40 foot 
skid mark it was his opinion Jon Larson was going 
30 miles per hour (R. 419). Officer Gunn also on 
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cross examination told us that in estimating the 
speed of Jon Larson's vehicle he di'd not take into 
consideration in making his estimrate of speed on 
the plaintiff's car the amount of physical damage 
to e'ach vehicle ( R. 425), any braking prior to the 
skid marks (R. 425) and admitted that where the 
cars came to rest, the amount of damage and shadow 
marks of tires should have been considered in mak-
ing an estimate of speed based on physical evidence 
( R. 425). Officer Gunn also said the damage to 
each car was considerable ( R. 424) rand said all of 
the skid marks he considered were left by the Larson 
vehicle prior to the time o'f impact. 
Exhibit P-4 and the testimony of Office Gunn 
(R. 131) shows the path of each vehicle prior to 
and after the impact. Likewise, on voir dire exam-
ination Officer Gunn testified that there was no 
hedge (R. 121) and thrat his measurement began 
from the corner of the house ( R. 121) and not from 
the hedge as plain tiffs' counsel says on page 4 of 
Appellants' brief. 
Officer Gunn also testified ( R. 126) that at 
the time defendant noticed the plaintiff's auto first 
it was approximately 50 feet away when the defen-
dant entered the intersection (R. 12'5). Defendant 
also admitted that as he entered the intersection 
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Exhibit P-4 shows the Larson car travelled a 
distance a:bout twice as far as the Evans car in 
the same amount of time and at a time when the 
defendant admitted he was going as much as 30 
miles per hour ( R. 126) . 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS CONFLICTING AND 
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF ITON 
LARSON AND THAT JON LARSON'S CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTE'D 
TO THE ACCIDENT AND PLAINTIFFS' INJURIES. 
POINT II 
THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES IS FOR THE 
J·URY TO DECIDE. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFF AND IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MO-
TION FOR NE'W TRIAL. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR PREJUDICIALLY IN 
GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 3. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR PRErrUDICALLY IN 
SIUB'MITTING INSTR'UCTION NO. 8. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS CONFLICTING AND 
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF JON 
LARSON AND THAT JON LARSON'S CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE ACCIDENT AND PLAINTIFFS' INJURIES. 
Where judgment is rendered on conflicting evi-
dence, the evidence will be reviewed on appeal in 
the light most favorable to the person for whom 
judgment was rendered in the court below. W eenig 
Bros. Inc. vs. Manning, 1 Utah 2nd 101, 26!2 P 2nd 
491; North vs. Cartwright, 119 Utah 516, 2'29 P. 
2nd 871; Staton vs. Western Maoaroni Manufactur-
ing Company, 52 Utah 426, 174 P. 821. Likewise 
in Martin vs. Sheffield, 112 U. 478, 189 P. 2nd 127, 
where there was conflicting testimony with regard 
to an intersection collision, this court said where 
reasonable minds might differ as to which version 
of events should be believed and as to whether plain-
tiffs conduct contributed to the 1accildent the case 
should be submitted to the jury. 
Where a witness modifies or varies his testi-
mony in cross examination a particular part . of his 
testimony on direct examination which was favor-
, able may not be singled out to the exclusion of other 
parts of equal importance bearing on the subject. 
'Alvardo vs. Tucker, 2 Utah 2nd 16, 268 P. 2nd 986. 
There were many conflicts in the plaintiff's 
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testimony. On cross examination (R. 409, 19'8) Jon 
Larson testified he did not see the defendant's car 
until it was in the intersection. On direct examin-
ation when he wanted to talk about the speed of 
the defendant's car he said he observed the defen-
dant's car for two seconds (R. l73). Jon lJarson 
testified as he entered the intersection (R. 171) 
he had no thought of anyone approaching from the 
east. The point of impact was less than one car 
length from the east curb line of 23rd East (See 
Exhibit P-4). Yet, Jon Larson claimed to have ob-
served the defendant's car for two seconds prior 
to the impact to judge it's speed (R. 173). 
When Jon Larson's deposition was taken he 
told me he did not apply his brakes (R. 199). After 
Jon Larson heard Officer Gunn testify he said he 
believed he used his brakes ( R. 199) . At the time 
Jon Larson's deposition was taken he testified he 
never saw the defendant's auto until the front of 
his car was at the middle of Evergreen (R. 410). 
But on direct examination he testified (R. 199) he 
was applying the brakes of his car as he entered the 
intersection. 
On direct examination (R. -171) Jon Larson 
testified his speed was 20 miles per hour as he pass-
ed the market on the Southwest corner of the in-
tersection. Later he testified as he entered the in-
tersection his speed was 25 miles per hour (R. 171, 
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409). Thereafter plain tiffs called Officer Gunn as 
an expert witness (R. 419) and Officer Gunn testi-
fied that based on the 40 foot skid mark only it 
was his opinion Jon Larson was going 30 miles 
per hour. On cross examination Officer Gunn has-
tened to add that in estimating the speed of Jon 
Larson he did not consider in making his estimate 
the distance Jon Larson's car might have travelled 
before it left visible skid marks, the force of the 
impact and the considerable damage to each ve-
hicle, and the distance each vehicle travelled after 
the impact ( R. 425) . 
Plaintiffs own witness testified that the speed 
of plaintiff's car was greater than 30 miles per 
hour. Enough greater to do considera:ble damage 
to each vehicle and to carry it 52 feet beyond the 
point of impact. This was another conflict in plain-
tiffs' case and there was substantial evidence to 
show plain tiff's speed was considerably in excess 
of 30 miles per hour. 
Plaintiff's examination of the defendant (R. 
123) ~as well as the testimony of plaintiff's witness 
Clifford Coon ( R. 134) shows this accident occurred 
in a residential area. Mr. Coon testified he liveld 
in a house on the corner (R. 134). 
Section 41-6-46 (2) (b) provides the speed limit 
in a residential area is 25 miles per hour and this 
is so whether it be day or night. 
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Jon Larson testified he was familiar with this 
intersection and knew it to be a dangerous inter-
section ( R. 40'9) . He claimed to be particularly 
alert as he entered the intersection (R. 409). 
Under such circumstances it is established law 
that what is a reasonable and prudent speed under 
the conditions and having regard for actual and 
potential hazards then existing is a matter about 
which there is room for considerable disagreement 
and such being the case a jury question is presented. 
Lodder vs. Western Pacific R. Company, 123 U. 
(316, 250 P. 2nd 589, 59'3. 
Jon Larson admitted he just slowed down to 
25 as he entered the intersection ( R. 409). Officer 
Gunn testified pl'aintiff's car skidded into the inter-
section (R. 128). That indicates a substantial speed 
in excess of 25 miles per hour. 
Exhibit P-4 shows impa;ct occurred on plain-
tiff's side of road and that although Jon Larson 
testified (R. 405) there was no traffic entering the 
intersection from the North or West he did not have 
control enough to swerve his car to the unused side 
of the road. 
The defendant immediately turned to the North 
(R. 116) and it appears without doubt that if the 
plaintiff had been keeping any lookout and driving 
at a -reasonable speed he could have swerved and 
avoided the collision. 
10 
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Many times this court has S1aid the question of 
proximate cause is for the jury. In Sweet vs. Salt 
Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 325, 134 P. 1;167, this 
court said whether the speed at which the vehicle 
was going at the time of the accident was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident was ~a question of fact. 
In Horsley vs. Robinson, 11'2 U. 22'7, 186 P. 2nd 
592, this court again said the question of excessive 
speed and proximate cause was for the jury. 
On the question of lookout in Devereaux vs. 
Gener,al Electric Company, 5 Utah 2nd 433, 304 P. 
2nd 375, this court said where plaintiff failed to 
see defendants approaching car on the highway as 
plaintiff was entering the highway, it was for the 
jury to decide if the plaintiffs negligent failure to 
see the defendant's car was the proxim1ate cause of 
the collision. 
The question of keeping a proper lookout is 
generally a jury question. Coombs vs. Perry. 2 Utah 
2nd 381, 275 P. 2nd 680; Stickle vs. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, 1'22 Utah 477, 2'51 P. 2nd 86'7; 
Lowder vs. Holley, 120 Utah ·2131, 233 P. 2nd 350. 
In Martin vs. Sheffield, 1'12 Utah 478, 189 P. 2nd 
127, where accident arose out of intersection colli-
sion this court said the question as to the contribu-
tory negligence of the plain tiff in failing to keep 
a proper lookout was for the jury. 
The rights of users of the highways are rela-
11 
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tive, and one is not relieved of the duty of using due 
care simply because he is the apparent possessor of 
the right of way and the question is whose negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the 'accident and 
injury. Sine vs. Salt Lake Transportation Company, 
106 Utah 289, 147 P. 2nd 8'75, 878, Bullock vs. 
Lake, 98 Utah 501, 98 P. 2nd 3i50. 
Jon larson's testimony was conflicting in all 
respects 'and it was properly submitted to the jury 
to evaluate. 
This court in considering the plaintiffs' appeal 
must review the evidence, together with every in-
ference fairly arising therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the defendant who prevailed in the 
court below. Toomer's Estate vs. Union Pacific Rail-
road Company, 121 Utah 37, 239 P. 2nd 163, Coombs 
vs. Perry, 2 Utah 2nd '2'8, '27:5 P. 2nd 680. 
POINT II 
THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES IS FOR THE 
JURY TO DECIDE. 
Jon Larson admitted he did not see the defen-
dant's car until he was right upon it in the inter-
section '(R. 40'9, 198). Later he claimed to have 
observed it for two seconds ( R. 1'73) going at a 
terrifi~ speed. Later he said he had no thought of 
anyone 'approaching the intersection from the East 
(R. 171). Yet, plaintiffs called Officer Gunn who 
testified ( R. 419) plaintiffs car was skidding long 
before it reached the intersection. 
12 
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Jon Larson claimed he could not see through 
the hedge and did not see defendant's car until it 
was entering the intersection. The skid marks and 
testimony of Officer Gunn as well as Jon lJarson's 
~statement that he observed the defendant's car for 
two seconds ( R. 173) controvert his claim that the 
hedge was dense and if believed would show he was 
warned of defendant's approach by defendant auto 
h~adlights and could not stop because of his speed 
or because he did not heed the warning in time. 
The credibility of a witness is for the jury. 
Gittens vs. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2nd 392, 284 P. 2nd 
1115; Martin vs. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 P. 2nd 
7 47; Gibbs vs. Blue Cab, 122 Utah 312, Re. 1'23 
Utah 281,249 P. 2nd 213. 
Likevvise, when a witness, whose i1npeachment 
is attempted, is a party to the action, the witness' 
prior contradictory statement is ~an admission 
against interest and may be considered both as an 
admission and for the purpose of testimony the 
credibility of the witness. Rose vs. Otis (1892) 
- Colorado -, 31 Pac. 49'3; State vs. H ougensen, 
91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2nd 229. If a witness willfully 
testifies ftalsely as to any material matter, the jury 
ls at liberty to disbelieve the whole of the witness' 
testimony. Gittens vs. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2n1d 39'2, 
284 P. 2nd 1115. Also, the jury, in determining 
whether, and to what extent to believe a witness, 
may consider the witness' appearance, general de-
13 
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meanor, manner of expression and candor or want 
of it in answering questions on both direct and cross 
eX~amination. Gittens vs. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2nd 392, 
284 P. 2nd 1115. 
The general rule is that a party will not be per-
mitted to change his story to make out a case. In 
Tebbs vs. Peterson, 1'2'2 Utah 214, 247 P. 2nd 89'7, 
where at first trial the plaintiff said he di'dn't re-
member seeing any cars coming toward him 'and 
where at second trial plaintiff said he was blinded 
'by oncoming lights, and where trial court directed 
a verdict for the defendant, this court said the 
plaintiff was bound by his prior testimony and will 
not be permitted to change his story to m'ake out a 
case. 
It follows that in this case Jon Larson was 
bound by his prior testimony ( R. 410) on the ques-
tion of keeping a proper lookout and should not 
have been permitted to change his story to show he 
observed defendant's car for two seconds (R. 173) 
just to rebut defendant's claim he was not keeping 
a proper lookout. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFF AN'D IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' l\1:0-
TION FOR NE·w TRIAL. 
Defendant incorporates herein the argument 
set forth under Points I and II. 
14 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR PREJUDICIALLY IN 
GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 3. 
In Toone vs. J. P. O'Neill Construction Com-
pany, 40 Utah 265, 121 P. 10, the court gave the 
following instruction to which appellant objected. 
The request was as follows: 
"If you find from the evidence that the 
plaintiff upon his own judgment uninfluenced 
by any a:ssurance of safety on part of the de-
fendant's forem1an, a:s to whether or not the 
place he was standing at the time he fired 
the shot was safe, or if you find that the 
plaintiff selected the place but he fired the 
blast without dire-ctions or suggestions of the 
defendant's foreman, then the defendant is not 
liable, and you should deturn a verdict for 
the defendant. 
On appeal when appellant objected this court said: 
" ... One way the court might have fol-
lowed in charging the jury would have been 
to charge them in separate instructions, first, 
in accordance with respondent's evidence ; 
and second in accordance with appellants evi-
dence which related to the proposition covered 
by the instruction in question, a~d in each in-
struction have directed the jury to return a 
verdict in accordance with their findings up-
on that question. The court was not bound 
to charge the jury in separate instructions, 
but could cover the question in one without 
offending against appellant's rights." 
It is clear from the Toone case in Utah you 
can instruct on unrelated propositions in the same 
15 
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instruction and that appellant has not accurately 
cited the holding of the Toone case in appellant's 
brief. Toone vs. J. P. O'Neill Construction Com-
pany, 40 Utah '265, 121 P. 10. 
Nor does the case of Riding vs. Roylance, 63 
Utah 12121, '224 P. 885, as'Sist appellant. In the 
Riding case, the trial court erred in instructing 
jury that defendant would not be liable if driver 
was not employee and this instruction was held mis-
leading as the undisputed evidence was contrary 
and hence the instruction was prejudicial in char-
acter. 63 Utah 221, 224 P. 885. 
Instruction No. 3 was short and concise. It was 
not an instruction upon contributory negligence but 
merely an explanation to the jury what the effect 
of contributory negligence on the part of Jon Larson 
would be on the other plaintilfs. It was explanatory 
only in character and was a correct sta tern en t of 
law. 
It appears Judge Faux was following the ad-
monition in J.I.F.U. given at page XV wherein it 
is said, "The fewer instructions given the better". 
This instrU'ction obviously had no prejudicial 
~effect. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR PRE'J1UDICALLY IN 
SUBMITTING INSTRUCTION NO. 8. 
· The ne'gligen'ce of the defendant was found to 
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be a proximate cause of the accident. He admitted 
his fault and further the jury in answering Inter-
rogatory No. 1 (R. 182) showed they were not con-
fused about the defendant's negligence as they 
found it proximately caused the accident and the 
injuries of which the pl'aintiff complained. 
Instruction No. 8 is found in J.I.F.U._ 2.3 at 
page 12, and of course, is a recommended Jury in-
struction form. 
The instruction was necessary because defen-
dant had to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
1dence that Jon Larson was contributorily negl'igent 
!and that his negligence proximately contributed to 
the accident 'and the injuries of which plaintiffs 
complained. 
Since the special interrogatories show the jury 
was not confused the cases cited in appellants' brief 
involving verdicts are not in point. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the ( 1) inconsistent and contradic-
tory statements of Jon Larson relating to lookout 
and speed, ( 2) the conflicting testimony of Jon 
Larson as contrasted to the physical facts with re-
gard to speed and lookout, ( 3) the question of the 
credibility of the plaintiffs statements, and ( 4) the 
testimony of Officer Gunn, there was substantial 
evidence upon which the jury properly found Jon 
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Larson guilty of contributory negligence and that' 
the same proximately contributed to the accident. 
As Judge Faux said in his Memorandum Deci-
sion (R. 103) there was too much evidence of con-
tributory negligence to let the jury say no contri-
butory negligence and the verdict was justified. 
Further, a review of the case shows the court 
below did not err prejudicially. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND M. BERRY 
Attorney for the Defendant 
and Respondent 
203 Executive Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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